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CASE COMMENTS
MEAD CORP. V. TILLEY: GREAT EXPECTATIONS (BUT No
BENEFITS)
UNDER THE EMPLOYEE Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA),' when an employer sponsors and then volunta-
rily terminates a defined benefit pension plan,' all accrued bene-
fits' automatically vest,4 irrespective of the plan's applicable vest-
ing provisions. Plan. assets are then distributed according to the
six-tier allocation scheme established in section 4044(a) of
ERISA,5 which requires first that all non-forfeitable benefits guar-
anteed by the Pension Benefits Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) 6 be
I. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1982) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461
(1982 & Supp. V 1987) [hereinafter ERISA].
2. A defined benefit pension plan, in general terms, offers deferred compensation to
employees in the form of a specific benefit upon retirement. The benefit is often an annuity,
but may also be paid in other terms, such as a lump sum payment. Stein, Raiders of the
Corporate Pension Plan: The Reversion of Excess Plan Assets to the Employer, 5 AM. J.
TAX POL'Y 117, 117 n.1 (1986). For a description of the requirements for annuities when a
plan is terminated see 29 C.F.R. § 2617.4 (1989) (describing the requirements for benefits
payable as annuities). The plan is funded through contributions by the employer.
3. An accrued benefit is an individual's benefit "expressed in the form of an annual
benefit commencing at normal retirement age .... " 29 U.S.C. § 1002(23)(A) (1982).
"An accrued benefit, . . . represents the interest in a retirement benefit that a participant
earns each year, and a plan must state a method or formula for determining a participant's
annual accrual rate. This requirement enables a worker to mark his or her progress toward
the full pension benefit due at retirement." Hoover v. Cumberland, Md., Area Teamsters
Pension Fund, 756 F.2d 977, 981-82 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 845 (1985)
(footnote omitted). In other words, "an employee's accrued benefit at any particular point
in time is what a fully vested employee would be entitled to receive under the terms of the
plan if employment ceased at that particular point in time." Ashenbaugh v. Crucible Inc.,
1975 Salaried Retirement Plan, 854 F.2d 1516, 1524 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 3155 (1989). An accrued benefit, is "the amount of normal retirement benefit which an
employee has earned at any given time." Hoover, 756 F.2d at 984.
4. "A [plan] participant becomes fully vested when he gains a nonforfeitable right to
receive his entire accrued benefit." Hoover, 756 F.2d at 983.
5. 29 U.S.C. § 1344 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
6. The PBGC is a "body corporate" within the Department of Labor which adminis-
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distributed to plan participants,7 and then, that "all other nonfor-
feitable benefits under the plan"' and "all other benefits under the
plan" also be distributed.' 0 If plan assets remain after all liabili-
ties have been satisfied, the surplus funds revert back to the
employer."
In Mead Corp. v. Tilley, 2 the United States Supreme Court
ters the payment of benefits when private pension plans terminate. 29 U.S.C. § 1302
(1982).
7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1344(a)(l)-(4) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). If plan assets are not
sufficient to cover the benefits in subsections 1344(a)(1)-(4), the PBGC will cover the dif-
ference. 29 U.S.C. § 1361 (1982). Should this occur, the employer must reimburse the
PBGC. 29 U.S.C. § 1362 (Supp. V 1987).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(5) (1982).
9. 29 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(6) (1982).
10. Section 4044(a) of ERISA provides:
Allocation of assets
(a) Order of priority of participants and beneficiaries
In the case of the termination of a single-employer plan, the plan adminis-
trator shall allocate the assets of the plan (available to provide benefits) among
the participants and beneficiaries of the plan in the following order:
(I) First, to that portion of each individual's accured [sic] benefit which is
derived from the participant's contributions to the plan which were not
mandatory contributions.
(2) Second, to that portion of each individual's accrued benefit which is
derived from the participant's mandatory contributions.
(4) Fourth-
(A) to all other benefits (if any) of individuals under the plan guaranteed
under this subchapter ....
(5) Fifth, to all other nonforfeitable benefits under the plan.
(6) Sixth, to all other benefits under the plan.
29 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987) (footnote omitted).
The six priorities specified in section 4044(a) range from "Category 1, which has the
narrowest scope and highest priority, to Category 6, which has the broadest scope and
lowest priority." Blessitt v. Retirement Plan for Employees of Dixie Engine Co., 848 F.2d
1164, 1168 (11th Cir. 1988).
11. ERISA § 4044(d) provides in relevant part that:
(d) Distribution of residual assets; restrictions on reversions pursuant to recently
amended plans; assets attributable to employee contributions; calculation of re-
maining assets
(I) Any residual assets of a single-employer plan may be distributed to the
employer if-
(A) all liabilities of the plan to participants and their beneficiaries have
been satisfied,
(B) the distribution does not contravene any provision of law, and
(C) the plan provides for such a distribution in these circumstances.
29 U.S.C. § 1344(d) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
12. 109 S. Ct. 2156 (1989).
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overruled the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, 3 holding that sec-
tion 4044(a) does not require employers who terminate defined
benefit plans to pay plan participants' "benefit expectancies"' 4
before surplus plan assets can revert to the employer. Plaintiffs
were employees of the Lynchburgh Foundry Company, a wholly-
owned subsidiary of defendant Mead Corp., and participants in
Mead's defined benefit plan. Under the terms of that plan, Mead
paid unreduced early retirement benefits to participants who had
worked at least thirty years and had reached the age of sixty-two
before retiring.' 5 When Mead terminated the plan after selling
Lynchburgh Foundry, four of the five plaintiffs had met the ser-
vice requirement, but had not yet turned sixty-two. Mead, in dis-
tributing plan assets, paid the plaintiffs reduced retirement bene-
fits. The plaintiffs protested, claiming that section 4044(a)(6)
entitled them to benefit expectancies (such as the unreduced re-
tirement benefits) because, had the plan not terminated, they
would have eventually met the age requirement. 6 Although the
13. Tilley v. Mead Corp., 815 F.2d 989 (4th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 2156
(1989). The Fourth Circuit, after examining the language, legislative history, and agency
interpretation of section 4044(a) determined that section 4044(a)(6) required payment of
unreduced early retirement benefits to plan participants, despite the fact that those benefits
might not have been accrued at the time of the plan termination. The court then ordered
that plaintiffs be paid damages, and provided a formula for calculating them. Id. at 992.
14. Mead, 109 S. Ct. at 2163. "Benefit expectancies" as used in this Comment are
those which the employees did not earn under the terms of the plan, but which the employ-
ees could reasonably have expected to earn had the plan not been terminated. For example,
consider a benefit plan which provides that an employee qualifies for full retirements upon
reaching the age of sixty-five. Employee A is fifty-nine when the plan is terminated. The
benefit expectancy approach would hold that Employee A could reasonably have expected
to be employed by the same company at the age of 65, and therefore the benefits due her
are full retirement benefits based in part on six years of anticipated future employment,
and not the benefits earned up to the point of the termination. Thus, an employer, before
plan assets can revert to him, must satisfy not only an employee's accrued benefits under
the plan, but also the benefits that would accrue if the employee continued to work for the
company after the plan terminated. In essence, the employee's reasonable expectations that
she will work six more years with the company vests in her the right to the full retirement
benefits.
15. Participants were eligible for early retirement benefits at age 55. These benefits
were calculated in the same way as normal retirement benefits, but were reduced by five
percent for every year an employee's retirement preceded the normal retirement age.
Mead, 109 S. Ct. at 2160. Thus, the unreduced retirement benefits provided the employees
the opportunity to receive full retirement payments, rather than the reduced payments,
even though they retired prior to the normal retirement age.
16. The difference between the unreduced and reduced benefits was, on the average,
about $9000 per plaintiff. Id. 109 S. Ct. at 2160-61. Mead recovered almost $11 million
dollars that remained in the fund after the plan's liabilities were satisfied. Id. at 2161.
Therefore, there was sufficient money left in the plan to pay plaintiffs the unreduced retire-
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Court rejected this statutory argument, the case was remanded to
determine whether other sections of ERISA might require the em-
ployer to pay participants' benefit expectancies prior to reversion
of surplus assets.17
The Court's decision in Mead foreclosed the issue of benefit
expectancy under section 4044, but its decision to remand the case
still left open the benefit expectancy issue. This Comment will ex-
amine in detail the Court's decision and the policy considerations
which make the result an unfortunate one. It will conclude that
the payment of benefit expectancies should not be required under
any section of ERISA.
I. HISTORY
Ideally, a defined benefit plan's "assets at any given moment
[should] match precisely the plan's liabilities,"' 8 but in practice,
employers usually either under- or overfund the plans they spon-
sor, often because of actuarial error.' 9 By terminating overfunded
plans, employers can recover surplus assets. The favorable tax
provisions governing employer contributions to defined benefit
plans give employers who recover the surplus assets a considerable
tax advantage. "When a plan sponsor contributes to a plan, the
sponsor receives a current deduction. The contribution, with its
investment return, is not taxed until it is paid, either as a benefit
to a participant or as a reversion to a plan sponsor. It is then
taxed to the recipient at the recipient's tax rate in the year of
receipt."20 Since the contribution is not taxed until distribution,
the recipient stands to gain a "considerable tax savings over the
usual alternative of immediate taxation at the time of contribution
ment benefits.
17. Id. at 2164.
18. Stein, supra note 2, at 121.
19. How much an employer contributes to a plan is based upon calculations made by
actuaries, whose job is to ensure that there is enough money in the plan to meet the de-
mands on it. The inexact nature of this task usually results in under- or overfunded plans.
Upon choosing an actuarial method, the actuary must engage in a complex maze of guess-
work, including predictions about growth and interest rates and the employee group. It is
likely the prediction will not be entirely accurate. Hence, if less growth or less favorable
interest rates than anticipated prove the predictions too liberal, the result will be an un-
derfunded plan. If greater growth or more favorable interest rates prove the prediction too
conservative, the plan will be overfunded. See id. at 121-22. Currently, more than 80% of
the plans are overfunded. Light, The Power of the Pension Funds, BusiNEss WEEK, Nov.
6, 1989, at 154.
20. Stein, supra note 2, at 167.
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and subsequent annual taxation of the earnings thereon."'21 Thus,
"allowing employers to recover surplus assets creates the abusive
potential for using pension funds as a vehicle for tax-sheltered in-
vestments ..".2. Perhaps because of the financial benefits of
recovering surplus plan assets, plan terminations have been on the
rise.2
Although employers stand to gain by terminating overfunded
plans, employees may lose.24 This situation has raised a considera-
ble amount of controversy, 25 but Congress and federal agencies
21. Id.; see Ippolito, Issues Surrounding Pension Terminations For Reversion, 5 AM.
J. TAX POL'v 81, 88 (1986). Mr. Ippolito demonstrates the magnitude of this advantage by
contrasting the behavior of two different companies. The corporate tax rate in the hypo-
thetical is fifty percent, the pre-tax interest rate is seven percent, and the post-tax interest
rate is three-and-one-half percent. Firm A contributes $100 of profits to a qualified plan.
The corporate tax is deferred on the contribution, and the $100 accumulates at the pre-tax
interest rate. Twenty years later, the plan is terminated, and that $100 contribution plus
interest is left as a reversion. After the corporate tax is applied, Firm A will have $202.50.
Firm B, on the other hand, saved the $100 outside the pension plan. The $100 profit is
subject to the corporate tax immediately, leaving $50, which accumulates at the post-tax
interest rate. After twenty years, Firm B has $100.70, less than half what Firm A has. Id.
at 88-89.
22. Blessitt v. Retirement Plan for Employees of Dixie Engine Co., 848 F.2d 1164,
1177 n.29 (11 th Cir. 1988). Plan sponsors can "look at excess plan assets as a cheap source
of capital, which could be used to revive economically strapped enterprises, to expand
healthy ones, or to fend off unwelcome takeover attempts." Stein, supra note 2, at 127.
"[A] company can close a fund, pay off its workers and utilize the excess cash for, say, a
marketing campaign or plant expansion. As a result, some companies with surplus pension
funds become targets for takeovers; others cash out their pension plans and use the profits
to raid other companies." Roberts, Why Washington Is Worried About Your Pension, U.S.
NEws & WORLD REP., Nov. 13, 1989, at 42. One study indicated that from 1985 to 1988,
86 percent of the companies that received pension revisions "were involved in merger activ-
ity." Garland, Congress has that Lean and Hungry Look, BUSINESS WEEK, Nov. 6, 1989,
at 162. United States Senator Howard Metzenbaum of Ohio said, "[w]hen push comes to
shove and business needs easy cash for a merger or takeover or any other purpose, the
pension plan is one of the first places they look." Id.
23. "In the period 1965-1969, only one defined benefit plan participant in 1,000 was
affected by a termination in a given year; during the period 1980-84, 7.3 participants per
1,000 were affected each year." Ippolito, supra note 21, at 91. From 1980-86, 1220 plans
were terminated, transforming $12 billion dollars of pension assets into corporate assets. S.
BRUCE, PENSION CLAIMS: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS 608 (1988). In one highly publicized
case, United Airlines announced plan terminations that would net the company one billion
dollars in surplus assets. Stein, supra note 2, at 119. But see infra notes 49-59 and accom-
panying text (showing that the increase in plan terminations cannot realistically be attrib-
uted to the desire to recover plan assets).
24. When a plan terminates, "the result is lower benefits and less security for the
workers." Roberts, supra note 22. See infra note 45 and accompanying text for a complete
discussion.
25. See Stein, supra note 2, at 130, n.55.
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have been reluctant to address the perceived problems. 6 The
courts, on the other hand, have been more sensitive to this contro-
versy. Two decisions by federal appellate courts, including the
Fourth Circuit opinion in Mead, interpreted section 4044(a)(6) to
include benefit expectancies, thus forcing employers to pay these
speculative benefits before recovering plan assets.27 Such a re-
quirement discourages plan terminations, since the mandated pay-
ment of benefit expectancies decreases the amount of the em-
ployer's reversion. The employees gain either way: they continue
to earn benefits if the employer is deterred from terminating the
plan; or, even if the plan is terminated, the employees receive the
benefits they would have earned had the plan remained in
existence.
Despite the seeming appeal of this judicial solution to the po-
tential problems created by allowing surplus funds to revert upon
plan termination, other federal appellate courts rejected the
idea.28 This conflict among the circuits set the stage for the Su-
26. Id. at 130. Congressional interest in benefit expectancies has recently been on the
rise, however. A bill limiting the reversion of surplus plan assets has been approved by both
houses of Congress, and could become law, although probably in watered-down form. See
Roberts, supra note 22. The legislation, sponsored by Senator Metzenbaum and United
States Representative William Clay of Missouri, "would require companies that want to
take reversions to provide enough money to meet all current and projected obligations
and to provide a one-time inflation adjustment." Garland, supra note 22, at 162.
27. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals was the first circuit court to require the
payment of benefit expectancies. In Amato v. Western Union International, Inc., 773 F.2d
1402 (2d Cir. 1985), the court was faced with an amendment of a defined benefit plan,
which the plaintiffs/employees argued created a partial termination. The court remanded
the case to the district court to decide whether a partial termination actually occurred. The
appeals court suggested that if the district court found that such a termination occurred,
section 4044(a)(6) should be read to entitle the employees to full retirement benefits re-
gardless of whether they had accrued, so long as assets were available to meet the partici-
pants' benefit expectations. Id. at 1415-16. The Amato plan provided, in part, that an
employee was entitled to full retirement benefits if his years of service and age equaled
seventy-five. Id. at 1405. Under the Amato court's interpretation of section 4044(a)(6), an
employee who had worked for twenty-one years, but was only forty-six years old (a total of
sixty-seven years), was still eligible to receive full retirement benefits based on his expecta-
tions that he would continue to work for the company for the necessary eight more years.
The court wanted to prevent an employer from "pulling the rug out from under promised
retirement benefits upon which his employees had relied during their long years of service."
Id. at 1409.
The Fourth Circuit, in Mead, was the next court to face the issue and explicitly en-
dorsed the Second Circuit's reading of § 4044(a)(6). Tilley v. Mead Corp., 815 F.2d 989,
991 (4th Cir. 1987) (calling Amato persuasive), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 2156 (1989).
28. Two cases decided subsequent to Amato and Mead rejected the notion that sec-
tion 4044(a)(6) required plan sponsors to pay out benefit expectancies before surplus plan
assets could revert. In Blessitt v. Retirement Plan for Employees of Dixie Engine Co., 848
[Vol. 40:553
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preme Court's decision in Mead.
II. Mead Corp. v. Tilley
A. The Majority Opinion
The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court of the United
States was whether, upon termination of a pension plan, section
4044(a)(6) requires benefits not earned under the terms of the
plan to be paid to plan participants before surplus plan assets re-
vert to the employer. Writing for the eight-member majority, Jus-
tice Marshall answered the inquiry in the negative, holding that
section 4044(a)(6) did not create in plaintiffs the right to recover
the benefit expectancies they sought.29
Plaintiffs presented two arguments based on section
4044(a)(6). First, they argued that the legislative history behind
section 4044(a) indicated that the section entitled them to unac-
crued benefits like the unreduced early retirement benefits and
other benefit expectancies." The House of Representatives version
of the bill, in classifying payment priorities, listed one of the prior-
ity classes as "other accrued benefits," but the Conference bill
eliminated the word "accrued" and instead substituted "all other
benefits under the plan." The omission of the word "accrued,"
claimed the plaintiffs, evidenced Congressional intent not to limit
the allocation requirement to accrued benefits but to require that
surplus assets be used to meet employees' benefit expectations. 31
F.2d 1164 (11 th Cir. 1988) (in banc), the court faced "[t]he narrow but important issue
[of] whether, when a defined benefit plan terminates, [ERISA] requires that a defined
benefit plan pay an employee the full, unreduced pension benefit the employee would have
received had he continued to work until normal retirement age." Id. at 1164-65. The court
ultimately decided the question in the negative, noting that employees should not receive "a
benefit which is calculated on the basis of anticipated future years of service which have
not actually been worked as of the termination date." Id. at 1165. The Third Circuit, in
Ashenbaugh v. Crucible Inc., 1975 Salaried Retirement Plan, 854 F.2d 1516 (3d Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3155 (1989), was faced with the termination of a plan
almost identical to the one in Mead. Under the plan, "[i]f a Plan participant has 30 years
of service and is 62 or over, [the plan] allows that person to retire and receive the full
benefits to which he or she would be entitled if he or she were to wait and retire at age 65."
Id. at 1519. The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that section 4044(a)(6) created
substantive rights to contingent benefits upon plan termination. Rather, the court stated,
section 4044(a)(6) is merely an ordering provision. Id. at 1528.
29. Mead Corp. v. Tilley, 109 S. Ct. 2156, 2163 (1989).
30. Id. at 2162-63. Both the Amato and Tilley circuit courts relied on the legislative
history to support their holdings. See, e.g., Amato, 773 F.2d at 1416; Tilley, 815 F.2d at
992.
31. Mead, 109 S. Ct. at 2162; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.,
5591989-901
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The omission of a single word, the Court held, however, did not
suggest "that Congress intended § 4044(a) to be a source of bene-
fit entitlements rather than an allocation scheme. '3 2 Instead, the
Court found that the plain language33 and structure3 4 of the provi-
sion supported the PBGC's assertion that section 4044(a) "does
not create additional benefit entitlements. It merely provides for
the orderly distribution of benefits already earned under the terms
of a defined benefit plan or otherwise required at termination by
other provisions of ERISA. ' 35
The plaintiffs' second argument was based on the interplay
between sections 4044(a)(5) and 4044(a)(6).3 6 They claimed that
because all accrued benefits vest upon plan termination, these ben-
efits are included among the nonforfeitable benefits covered by
section 4044(a)(5). Therefore, if section 4044(a)(6) did not in-
clude unaccrued benefits like benefit expectancies, it would not in-
clude anything.37
Rejecting this interpretation of the two relevant subsections,
the Court agreed with the PBGC that section 4044(a)(6) "pro-
vides for the allocation of benefits that are forfeitable before plan
termination. 38 The PBGC's views were supported by its practice
of characterizing benefits "as forfeitable or nonforfeitable [de-
reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5038, 5154-55. The House bill con-
tained the following priorities: (a) employee contributions; (b) vested benefits of employees
already receiving benefits; (c) other vested benefits; (d) other accrued benefits; (e) interest
on accrued benefits; (f) remaining liabilities in the plan for payment upon termination; and
(g) pro-rata to each person entitled to receive a distribution on account of priorities (a)
through (f). The Senate bill included: (a) voluntary employee contributions; (b) mandatory
employee contributions; (c) benefits in pay status; (d) other insured benefits. Id. at 5154.
32. Mead, 109 S. Ct. at 2162.
33. The Court felt that the plain language of the statute clearly demonstrated that
section 4044(a) was an allocation mechanism, and did not confer substantive rights. The
language, "'benefits under the plan'- can refer only to the allocation of benefits." Id. Addi-
tionally, the introductory language of the section talks about allocation. Id. Finally, the
title of the section is "Allocation of assets." Id.
34. The structure of the statute was also used by the Court to support its decision.
"Title I of ERISA sets forth elaborate provisions to determine an employee's right to bene-
fits. Those provisions describe in detail the accrual of benefits and the vesting of accrued
benefits after service of a fixed number of years. Title IV, which contains § section
4044(a), simply provides for insurance for benefits created elsewhere. It is inconceivable
that this section was designed to modify the carefully crafted provisions of Title I." Id.
35. Id. at 2161. The PBGC filed an amicus brief in the case. The Department of
Labor and the IRS, the other agencies in charge of administering ERISA, concurred with
the PBGC argument. Id. at 2162.
36. See supra text accompanying notes 8-9.
37. Mead Corp. v. Tilley, 109 S. Ct. 2156, 2163 (1989).
38. Id. at 2163; see 29 C.F.R. § 2618.16 (1989).
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pending] upon their status before plan termination." 39
Despite overruling the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of sec-
tion 4044(a), the Court remanded the case, ordering the circuit
court to consider first, whether "unreduced early retirement bene-
fits may qualify as 'accrued benefits' under ERISA; and, second,
[whether] unreduced early retirement benefits may be 'liabilities'
within the meaning of § 4044(d)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. §
1344(d)(1)(A). ' 40 Thus, it remains possible that plaintiffs could
recover benefit expectancies like unreduced retirement benefits
under ERISA provisions other than section 4044(a). In deciding
these questions, the Court advised the Fourth Circuit to "consider
the views of the PBGC and the IRS.""
B. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Stevens, dissenting alone, agreed that the Court prop-
erly interpreted section 4044(a)(6). However, he took issue with
the Court's decision to remand. Instead, Stevens argued that ben-
efit expectancies were contingent liabilities under section 4044(d),
and as such, surplus assets could not be recovered by an employer
until he had satisfied employees' expectancy claims. Therefore,
plaintiffs were entitled to receive the unreduced retirement bene-
fits they sought.4 2 Stevens reasoned that plaintiffs had "far more
than an expectancy interest in early retirement benefits ...
[They] have earned them under the Plan by serving over 30 years
with Mead, and their right to payment is contingent only upon
their election to retire after reaching age 62.''4 Justice Stevens
embraced the idea that benefit expectancies should be paid before
plan assets can revert.
III. ANALYSIS
The language and construction of the statute, coupled with
the views expressed by the agencies in charge of administering
ERISA, leave little doubt that the Court correctly interpreted sec-
tion 4044(a) as denying Tilley any right to benefit expectancies
39. Mead, 109 S. Ct. at 2163; see 29 C.F.R. § 2613.6(b) (1987) ("benefits that
become nonforfeitable solely as a result of the termination of a plan [are] considered for-
feitable."); id. § 2618.2 (1987) (same).
40. Mead, 109 S. Ct. at 2164.
41. Id.
42. See Mead Corp. v. Tilley, 109 S. Ct. 2156, 2164 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 2165 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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upon plan termination. Disturbing, however, is what the Court did
not decide; specifically, whether the payment of benefit expectan-
cies might be mandated by other ERISA sections."' Although the
statutory language and legislative history of the alternative
ERISA sections is unclear, and agency views on the alternative
theories remanded to the Fourth Circuit are somewhat murky, the
Supreme Court should have been compelled by policy considera-
tions to put to rest the idea that, upon plan termination, benefit
expectancies should be paid before surplus assets can revert to the
plan sponsor.4 5
Initially, it is important to realize that requiring the payment
of benefit expectancies is functionally equivalent to reducing the
value of the reversion of surplus plan assets to employers upon
plan termination, since the employers' recoveries will be decreased
by the amount paid out in benefit expectancies.46
In a few situations, limiting plan reversions may be appropri-
ate, but generally, the policy reasons for allowing surplus plan as-
sets to revert outweigh those for requiring the payment of benefit
expectancies. Primarily, proponents of benefit expectancies are
concerned that employers will purposely terminate plans because
of the favorable tax implications of recovering plan assets, 47 thus
reaping a windfall at the expense of employees, who are denied
benefits they expected to earn,48 and the Federal Government,
44. See supra text accompanying notes 40-41.
45. The majority opinion was devoid of any consideration of the policy implications
inherent in requiring the payment of benefit expectancies.
46. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
47. See supra text accompanying notes 21-23.
48. There are several considerations involving the employee's right to get what he
has earned. The core argument for benefit expectancies is based on principles of fairness
and justice: the employee has been with the firm for a number of years, and under the
terms of the plan, would have been entitled to full benefits if the plan had not terminated.
It would seem unfair to deny him the right to benefits he could reasonably have expected to
earn, while tens of thousands of dollars revert to the employer. Since the reversion money is
available, it should be used to fulfill benefit expectancies.
Another argument is that ERISA makes clear the "benefit plans are designed as a
precise, although deferred, equivalent of current wages," Ashenbaugh v. Crucible Inc.,
1975 Salaried Retirement Plan, 854 F.2d 1516, 1538 (3d Cir. 1988) (Mansmann, J., dis-
senting), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3155 (1989), and should be considered the exclusive prop-
erty of those who earn them. Id.
A final argument concerns the method of payment upon plan termination. The normal
procedure when a defined benefit plan is terminated is for the employer to provide the
employee with an annuity, which usually commences at normal retirement age. However,
the plan may also offer the employee a lump sum payment equal to the benefit's present
value. ERISA § 4041(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1341(b)(3) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). The prob-
[Vol. 40:553
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which loses revenue to this tax shelter. These concerns, seemingly
supported by the increasing number of plan terminations,49 are
nevertheless significantly overstated. Moreover, limiting reversions
could prove more harmful than helpful to the employees.
The dire warnings that employers will terminate plans to re-
cover surplus assets, enriching themselves while harming the em-
ployees, are betrayed by statistics. The available evidence shows
that "while reversions have been increasing rapidly in recent
years, they are still an anomaly in defined benefit plans: the pen-
sion promise seems inviolate for the vast majority of firms and
workers." 50 This assertion is supported by several factors.
First, although defined benefit plan terminations are increas-
ing, so is the number of defined contribution plans. "In 1950, de-
fined contribution plans held 11.6 percent of private plan assets; in
1980 they accounted for 27.8 percent."5 " Similarly, 12.9 percent
of private plan participants in 1965 were solely or primarily cov-
ered by defined contribution plans, while in 1980, 18 percent of
participants were so covered.52 Thus, the phenomenon of defined
benefit terminations can be viewed as a necessary prerequisite for
lem with this distribution scheme is that the employee, upon receiving the annuity, "ex-
pects the value of his benefit to remain constant in real dollar terms"-in other words, to
reflect expected increases in salary. Stein, supra note 2, at 118; see Light, supra note 19, at
155 ("[P]eople usually do better staying in a pension program, where pay raises provide a
higher base on which benefits are figured."). However, the annuity "expresses a partici-
pant's benefit in nominal dollar terms." Stein, supra note 2, at 118. Thus, an employee
whose annuity is worth $15,000 in both real and nominal terms at the time of termination,
might discover that upon payment of the contract when he reaches normal retirement age,
the contract's real value may only be $10,000 (although its monetary value remains
$15,000). Had the plan not terminated and the employee worked to normal retirement age,
receiving in the meantime normal increases in pay designed to keep up with inflation, his
benefits would have reflected real dollar totals, since his annuity would be based on in-
creased contributions drawn from the increased salary. As one author has noted, "[t]he
difference between nominal and real pension benefits can be very large." Ippolito, supra
note 21, at 83. Significant economic research has shown that workers expect real pensions,
not nominal pensions. See id. at 85. Anything less than the real value of the benefit, there-
fore, will disappoint the employees. The payment of benefit expectancies, then, is a way to
make up for the inequities between the real and nominal values of pensions that inhere in
the distribution method of benefits upon plan determination. One possible alternative for
the employee if he wants to avoid the depreciation of his benefits is to demand his benefit
payment in a lump sum. That way, the money he gets is expressed in real terms. This
"substitution of present for deferred value," Stein, supra note 2, at 162, however, under-
mines the purpose of ERISA, which is to encourage retirement savings, since the employee
takes the lump sum well before normal retirement.
49. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
50. Ippolito, supra note 21, at 82.
51. Id. at 93.
52. Id.
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establishing defined contribution plans, rather than an employer's
attempt to selfishly recoup plan assets. In fact, one study showed
that "over 40 percent of the plans accounting for 82 percent of the
reversion total occurred in either so-called spinoffs or termination/
reestablishments. ' '53 Therefore, many defined benefit plans are
merely being terminated to create new (and better) plans with the
old plan's assets. The creation of more appealing plans with sur-
plus assets is not a windfall to the employer since it funnels the
money back into a benefits plan,54 and may be a windfall for the
employee, since he might initially have expected fewer benefits
under the old plan.
Second, 1984 statistics show that of the 279 billion dollars of
legal excess assets, only 1.2 percent of these revocable assets were
taken.5  The fact "[t/hat the vast majority of revertible assets are
not taken by the firms-even though they legally could be-is a
testament to the strength of the implicit pension gontract." 56 Fur-
ther, with regard to the few firms that do terminate plans and
take excess assets, evidence shows "that potential worker losses do
not increase the rate of terminations . . . .This [suggests] that
terminations may not be driven by schemes designed to take ad-
vantage of workers. . . ."I" These results contradict "the gener-
ally accepted notion that economic considerations compel firms to
fund fully their pension plan, taking advantage of the plan's tax-
exempt status."5 8
Simple common sense also suggests that employers will not
terminate plans to gain surplus assets because "an employer who
continues a plan will realize a greater financial benefit than the
sponsor who terminates a plan, recovers the plan assets, and pays
tax. This is because the interest on the trust corpus funds future-
53. Id. at 102. "Spinoffs occur when the firm splits the pension plan in two, one for
active workers and one for retirees. The firm then switches all the legal excess assets into
the retiree-participant plan and terminates only this plan, purchasing annuities for all the
then retirees." Id. Reestablishments occur when a plan sponsor terminates the plan for the
purpose of setting up another plan. The surplus assets go not to the employer, but to the
new plan. Id. at' 104. In 1988, of the 230 plans terminated, two-thirds were replaced by
other plans. Light, supra note 19, at 155.
54. At most, the employer gains the goodwill of its employees.
55. Ippolito, supra note 21, at 98. Overall, $1.7 trillion dollars are sitting in 870,000
different plans. Roberts, supra note 22, at 42; cf. Light, supra note 19, at 154 ($2.6 trillion
are in pension plans in the United States).
56. Ippolito, supra note 21, at 98.
57. Id. at 100.
58. Id. at 82.
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accruing benefits on a tax-deferred basis." 9 Hence, employers
who are motivated by the tax windfalls inherent in benefit plans
would rather continue the plan than terminate it. Additionally,
employers who terminate plans to the disadvantage of employees
may well be perceived "as dishonest in the labor market. Workers
would presumably be reluctant to invest significant portions of
their working lives in a firm that in the past has demonstrated a
propensity to cheat its workers. ' 60 This could impose added costs
(i.e. higher wages) upon the employer as it attempts to attract
workers.
Finally, in a defined benefit plan, "the employer bears the
investment risk that the plan assets will be insufficient to meet
benefit requirements when employees become eligible to receive
pensions. It is not inequitable to permit employers to receive the
benefit of the upside investment risk."6 1 Allowing a reversion in
this situation does not injure the employees at all, and rewards
entrepreneurial risk-taking. "[I]f the plan's assets are insufficient
to meet the plan's benefit obligations, the employer must make
additional contributions to the plan; on the other side. . . the em-
ployees only have an interest in receiving the promised benefit-so
long as that benefit is paid, the employees have lost nothing. 62
All these factors suggest that worries about tax windfalls
leading to unjust enrichment for employers at the expense of their
employees have been blown out of proportion. The findings seem
to "contradict the notion that terminations are effected. for the
purpose of imposing losses on workers and granting gains to stock-
holders. 63 In fact, it is conceivable that if employers are forced to
pay benefit expectancies, employees would get an undeserved
windfall, because even though the employee might have earned
the claimed benefits if the plan had not been terminated, the fact
remains that he did not actually do the work required to earn
those benefits. ERISA's purpose was not to provide employees
with "something for nothing;" rather, it was to prevent the em-
ployee from receiving "nothing for something"-to make sure the
accrued benefits equaled the years of service.64
59. Stein, supra note 2, at 169.
60. Ippolito, supra note 21, at 97.
61. Blessitt v. Retirement Plan for Employees of Dixie Engine Co., 848 F.2d 1164,
1177 (1lth Cir. 1988).
62. Stein, supra note 2, at 155.
63. Ippolito, supra note 21, at 82.
64. Blessitt, 848 F.2d at 1176.
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Not only is the surplus asset problem largely an illusion, but
the proposed solution of limiting plan reversions by requiring the
payment of benefit expectancies may actually harm employee in-
terests. Such a result can occur for three reasons.
First, limiting reversions may lead to the underfunding of
plans. "Allowing employers to recover plan assets only after meet-
ing the benefit expectancies [of employees] . . . would tend to en-
courage employers to minimally fund plans, thereby increasing the
possibility that plan assets would be insufficient to meet even
guaranteed benefits."" Minimal funding would turn overfunded
plans into underfunded plans, thereby denying employees not only
speculative benefit expectancies, but much more basic benefits.
This trend, of course, would be detrimental to the employees.66
Additionally, since ERISA's primary purpose was to correct the
problems of underfunded plans, a benefit expectancy rule encour-
aging employers to underfund plans would be entirely inconsistent
with Congressional intent.67
65. Id. at 1177. If the payment of benefit expectancies was required, employers
would have to pay yet another benefit before recovering surplus assets. The fewer the limits
on reversion, the greater the tendency of employers to use conservative actuarial methods
in funding their plans because they know that any overfunding caused by the conservative
methods will be returned to them upon termination. However, requiring employers to pay
benefit expectancies would "lead necessarily to less responsible funding patterns, i.e., that
employers will fund plans using less conservative actuarial methods and assumptions, since
conservative methods and assumptions will compound any overfunding, providing windfalls
to employees." Stein, supra note 2, at 172. For example, employers might tend to backload
contributions, "which will in turn seriously endanger the financial stability of plans in fu-
ture years when greater numbers of the plan participants approach retirement age." Id.
(citing, Memorandum on Pension Plan Terminations and Asset Reversions to Employers 9,
reprinted in PLAN TERMINATIONS/ASSET OR LIABILITY 381, 384-86 (Susko, Chairperson,
Practicing Law Institute, 1984). One method of backloading is the unit credit method,
where the employer totally funds each year's accrual in the year of accrual. Until the year
of accrual occurs, then, the employer contributions for non-accrued employees will be mini-
mal. Id. at 172-73 n.199.
Another related problem is that limited reversions might compel an employer to forego
establishing a pension plan altogether. See Light, supra note 19, at 156.
66. See Stein, supra note 2, at 135 ("Any change in the way the law now stands
would discourage something that should instead be encouraged-continued sponsorship of
defined benefit plans-and would encourage something that instead should be discour-
aged-irresponsible funding practices of any remaining defined benefit plans. ... ).
67. The legislative history of ERISA demonstrates that Congress was concerned pri-
marily with underfunded plans, not those overfunded plans which might lead to employer
reversions. Before ERISA was passed, "Congressional and media attention was focused on
a more prevalent problem [than overfunded plans]: some employees were receiving nothing
from their plans because the plan cupboards were bare, and locked besides. In plainer
terms, many plans were seriously underfunded .... " Stein, supra note 2, at 123. One
Senator noted some ten years after ERISA was born that he did "not believe that when
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Second, requiring the payment of benefit expectancies may
decrease benefits actually earned by other employees. If benefit
expectancies were paid, they would be competing for plan assets
along with other benefits. In a situation where the plan assets are
not sufficient to cover all claims, the money would be distributed
on a pro-rata basis, causing a dilution of the "more legitimate
claims based on actual service. . by the more speculative claims
based on future service not actually worked."68
Third, limiting reversions may lead to the loss bf employ-
ment. On certain occasions, plans may be terminated to recover
surplus assets that are needed to keep a company from going out
of business.6 9 If benefit expectancies need not be paid as a prereq-
uisite to reversion, "the full reversion [can] ...be pumped back
into the business . . [to] preserve jobs."7 However, under a rule
requiring payment of benefit expectancies, the reversion would be
significantly less after those liabilities are satisfied, thereby de-
creasing the chance that the reversion would save the ailing com-
pany. Given the choice between receiving benefit expectancies but
losing their jobs because the company goes out of business, or not
receiving benefit expectancies (thereby allowing full reversion to
the employer) and keeping their jobs, the employees would proba-
bly prefer the latter, viewing it as an investment in the continu-
Congress enacted ERISA, anyone foresaw the possibility that profitable companies would
terminate their over-funded pension plans in order to pocket hundreds of millions of dol-
lars. In fact, the concerns were quite the opposite." 130 CoNG. REc. $2794 (daily ed.
March 15, 1984) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum).
68. Blessitt v. Retirement Plan For Employees of Dixie Engine Co., 848 F.2d 1164,
1176 (11 th Cir. 1988). It could be argued that the more legitimate benefit claims could be
paid first, and benefit expectancies paid only if surplus assets remain. This approach would
eliminate the dilution of legitimate benefit claims. However, the applicable allocation
scheme is set forth in ERISA, and any distribution of plan assets must be done according
to the priority system provided in section 4044(a). Under this scheme, the only possible
priority category that benefit expectancies could fit into would be section 4044(a)(6) (con-
trary to the Mead Court's determination that section 4044(a)(6) did not include benefit
expectancies). Were that to occur, and the only way it could occur is if the Court overruled
its decision in Mead, section 4044(a)(6) would include not only accrued benefits which at
the time of the termination were forfeitable, but would also include the benefit expectan-
cies. Therefore, if plan assets were not sufficient to cover all section 4044(a)(6) claims, the
money would have to be distributed pro rata, leading to the dilution of the legitimate
claims. The only way to avoid this result, and to avoid overruling Mead, would be for
Congress to enact legislation expressly creating a seventh category in section 4044(a) that
would include only benefit expectancies.
69. See Ippolito, supra note 21, at 105 (potential business failure is a viable explana-
tion for some voluntary terminations).
70. Stein, supra note 2, at 184.
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ance of the business.7'
CONCLUSION
Although the Court's decision in Mead Corp. v. Tilley tem-
porarily forced the benefit expectancy argument back into its cof-
fin, the majority opinion regrettably failed to drive a stake
through its heart. Upon first glance, the benefit expectancy argu-
ment, and its underlying policies, may have some appeal. How-
ever, overriding policy considerations clearly indicate that requir-
ing the payment of benefit expectancies does little to serve
employee interests, and on the contrary, can be detrimental to
those interests. Hence, surplus plan assets should be allowed to
revert to employers when they terminate defined benefit plans, ir-
respective of whether the employers choose to pay employees' ben-
efit expectancies.
MICHAEL A. PAVLICK
71. Ippolito, supra note 21, at 105.
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